Resumen El artículo es un estudio de tres concepciones asiáticas de las virtudes, como son las virtudes taoístas, confucianas y budistas. De cada una se presenta el marco general de dicha tradición, la forma de entender las virtudes y el término medio. Así, se destacan en el taoísmo las virtudes de la compasión, la moderación y la humildad. En el confucianismo se estudian las virtudes de la humanidad, la justicia, los ritos, la sabiduría y la honestidad. En el budismo se (...) presentan las virtudes de la bondad amorosa, la compasión, la alegría altruista y la ecuanimidad. En cada una de estas tradiciones hay referencias al justo medio o camino medio. Esta comprensión de las virtudes asiáticas puede permitir una idea más amplia de las virtudes.This paper is a study of three Asian conceptions of virtues, such as the Taoist, Confucian and Buddhist virtues. Each one presents the general framework of every tradition, the way of understanding the virtues and the middle ground. Thus, the virtues of compassion, moderation and humility stand out in Taoism. In Confucianism the virtues of humanity, justice, rites, wisdom and honesty are studied. In Buddhism the virtues of loving-kindness, compassion, altruistic joy, and equanimity are presented. In each one of these traditions there are references to the middle right or middle path. This understanding of the Asian virtues may allow a wider idea of virtues. (shrink)

Resumen El artículo es una exploración mayéutica de la responsabilidad, pues mediante preguntas trata de explorar este tema. Inicia el autor desde las distintas maneras de dar respuesta, pues de ahí viene la palabra responsabilidad, ellas revelan nuestra pertenencia a la humanidad y a la naturaleza. Por eso, los lazos, los compromisos, las obligaciones vividas es lo que nos hace sentir responsables. La responsabilidad sentida como obligación o coerción externa solo refleja la ontología moderna que ha separado al individuo de (...) todo y de todos, por lo que prefiere la libertad a la responsabilidad. Se requiere pensar de otro modo la responsabilidad, pues este aislacionismo individualista no solo perjudica al propio individuo, sino a la humanidad y al planeta.This paper is a maieutic exploration of reponsibility, since by means of questions it tries to explore this topic. The author starts from the different ways of giving an answer, because that is where the word responsibility comes from, they reveal our belonging to humanity and nature. Therefore, the bonds, the commitments, the lived obligations are what make us feel responsible. The reponsibility felt as an obligation or external coercion just reflects the modern ontology that has separated the individual from everything and everyone, so he prefers freedom to responsibility. It is necessary to think reponsibility in another way, because this individualistic isolationism not only harms the individual himself, but also humanity and the planet. (shrink)

This work is an introduction on Polo's criticism of Saint Anselm's argument, showing that this argument is inefficient with respect to Polo's comprehesion of the intellect and Polo's study of the existence.

The objective of this article is to analyze the consequences that affect the First Metaphysical Principles when the Ontological Argument is established. Saint Anselm and Descartes do not share the same consideration about the first principles. My intention is to show the differences between their points of view and at the same time contrast these ideas with Polo's theory.

Esta obra compila los estudios presentados en las I Jornadas de Filosofía del Instituto CEU de Humanidades Ángel Ayala y está prologada por Abelardo Lobato, O. P. Los filósofos tienen el deber de buscar y alcanzar la verdad apelando a las fuerzas de la razón, la cual, por cierto, no impide otras vías genuinas de conocimiento, como la fe. La búsqueda intelectual exige un trabajo de análisis que debe afinarse ante las obcecaciones que a menudo se interponen en el (...) horizonte de la existencia humana. En no pocos momentos de la historia ha habido claudicaciones generalizadas ante esa búsqueda, olvidos más o menos conscientes de que las verdades se alcanzan si se mantiene la esperanza de sabiduría y el amor a ella. El relativismo y el escepticismo se presentan casi como el polo opuesto de esa esperanza y ese amor; como una consecuencia de la “con-fusión” cultural, de las mentiras interesadas y de la desidia moral de algunas sociedades. La nuestra, la europea occidental, es una de ellas. El relativismo afecta al modo de pensar y de comportarse del hombre y es habitual que le lleve por vericuetos que a la postre terminan dañándole a él y a sus congéneres. En este libro se analizan algunos errores que han llevado a suscribir las tesis del relativismo y a rechazar la posibilidad de dar con algunas verdades comunes para todos. La obra tiene dos partes, una histórica y otra temática. Las páginas con enfoque histórico estudian las tesis que sobre el relativismo han mantenido algunos pensadores o corrientes de la filosofía. De su lectura se puede extraer la conclusión de que el fenómeno del relativismo es tan viejo y tan actual como el propio hombre y su apertura inteligente a la verdad. Filósofos de la época antigua de la talla de Protágoras, Pirrón o los “Académicos” coetáneos de San Agustín; modernos como Descartes; contemporáneos como Wittgenstein o Kuhn han dejado huellas que luego abrieron el camino hacia un régimen de pensamiento en que el hombre abandona la posibilidad de admitir verdades universales. Algunos argumentos favorables al relativismo —y, más aún, algunas actitudes “propedéuticas” de él— se han ido instalando culturalmente hasta consolidarse de manera cada vez más indiscutida. La segunda parte analiza el relativismo de forma temática, como un asunto abordable desde las diversas ramas del saber filosófico. Así, se tratan las repercusiones que tiene esta forma de pensamiento en la pragmática, la lógica, la estética o la religión, y se intentan desenmascarar los tópicos y falsos argumentos que justifican un comportamiento ético o religioso “abierto a todas las opciones”. (shrink)

This book brings together previously unpublished work which looks at issues concerning the foundations and applications of a prominent branch of virtue epistemology: “performance-based epistemology”. The chapters in Part I examine some foundational issues in the conceptual framework of PBE: the relations between apt success and luck; the connection between aptness and a safety condition for knowledge; the fallibility of competences; the kind of reliability needed for knowledge and justification; the nature of epistemic agency; and some ways of enriching the (...) basic conceptual framework of PBE. The chapters in Part II discuss the application of PBE to outstanding problems in contemporary epistemology, such as the nature of a priori intuition; internalist objections to epistemic externalism; the roles that epistemic agency is meant to play in the acquisition of knowledge; the value of second-order reflection; the nature of some epistemic incompetences; and the problem of epistemic circularity. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

En su reciente libro Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction, Pérez y Gomila presentan una forma novedosa de entender nuestra capacidad de atribuir estados mentales a otras personas basada en lo que llaman interacciones en la segunda persona. Este artículo cuestiona la conceptualización y el papel explicativo que este tipo de interacciones pueden desempeñar.

El objetivo de este artículo es reflexionar acerca de los modos en los que la política y la economía se articulan en la cosmovisión aristotélica. Para ello trabajaremos dos ejes temáticos. En primer lugar, la relación entre oíkos y polis y, en segundo lugar, la relación entre economía y los regímenes políticos. uno de los aspectos nodales del trabajo gira en torno a mostrar nuestras diferencias con respecto a la hermenéutica de Arendt y, en tal sentido, el artículo hace énfasis (...) en la importancia que también tiene para Aristóteles la dimensión económica para pensar la política, cuestión más que clara en el régimen que el Estagirita considera el mejor posible: la politeia. The aim of this paper is to examine the ways in which politics and economy are articulated in the Aristotelian view. To achieve this end, two thematic axes are developed. First, the relationship between oikos and polis and, secondly, the relationship between economy and political regimes. One of the central features of this work is to show our differences with Arendt's hermeneutic. Thus, our paper emphasizes the importance of the economic dimension within Aristotle's political thought, even for thinking politics itself -an aspect that becomes clear in the constitution that Aristotle considered the best possible: the politeia. (shrink)

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...) Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science. (shrink)

In Postsocial History: An Introduction, historian Miguel A. Cabrera points to the crisis of modernity as a locus for the collapse of social historical models. Previously established theories of social change and social relations are proving insufficient, calling for the emergence of a new social historical theory. By arguing convincingly for the inclusion of language in that model, Cabrera awakens a revolutionary new approach to historiography. The book will prove indispensable to historians, and to social scientists in general, who (...) are dissatisfied with the old paradigms and seek new ways of addressing the challenges of social research. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...) of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. (shrink)

This article interprets the accounts and testimonies of native Chilean Pentecostalism, from a philosophical approach. In these accounts Pentecostal dilemmas are expressed and that oppressed beings prove by the economical and social conditions that the Chilean society lived in the 20th century. These dilemmas manifest anguish produced by absurd, emptiness and loneliness; that rise due to illness, alcoholism and poverty, which leads the individual to critical situations that push him to choose being Pentecostal, stigmatized beings and socially excluded, or to (...) suffer and death. Once they have chosen being Pentecostal the symbolic exodus starts, interpreting the past, the society and individuality in a tragic way. (shrink)

There is a substantive disagreement with regard to the characterization of pre-reflective self-awareness despite the key role that is supposed to play for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. One of the most prominent ones—between egological and non-egological views—is about the role that the subject of experience plays.I show that this disagreement falls short to capture the details of the debate, as it does not distinguish phenomenological and metaphysical disputes. Regarding the former, the contenders disagree on whether pre-reflective self-awareness (...) concerns the subject of experience or the experience itself. I first argue that such an awareness has to be indexical—de se or de mentis respectively—, and then show that de se awareness can straightforwardly address classical objec­tions against egological views, whereas de mentis awareness fails to support epistemological arguments in favor of non-egological ones. The metaphysical commitments of a phenomenologically egological view depend on what the corresponding de se awareness demands from reality. I consider two alternatives, the structural and the representational approach and offer some consid­erations in favor of the later and its prima facie neutrality with regard to the metaphysical dispute. (shrink)

En un artículo publicado recientemente en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusión que pone en jaque ciertas teorías de la consciencia, como él mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es mostrar que el razonamiento de Vidal no es sólido. (...) En particular, hago patente que el argumento depende de rechazar la relación ampliamente aceptada en epistemología entre creencia y conocimiento. Además, argumento que SC* o bien prejuzga la cuestión o bien involucra una noción de consciencia no relevante para la discusión. (shrink)

All around the world, but especially in the Third World, we are confronted by beggars who appeal to our sympathy. Most of us have no principled way to deal with the situation. Should we give to them? How much? To what purpose? We are inclined to let our momentary feelings dictate our response. Although applied ethicists have been tackling the general question of poverty in the world and what we ought to do, if anything, to alleviate it, nobody seems to (...) have taken an interest in the specific part of the general question which involves mendicity. This paper argues, firstly, that the question of our duties, if any, towards beggars demands a reasoned answer, and secondly, that careful reasoning indicates that we should channel the resources we are ready to give to beggars not tothem directly but rather to charities, for they have more and better information on who can and should be helped. (shrink)

El dossier sobre Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, su obra y su tiempo que presentamos recoge algunas de las ponencias que se presentaron y discutieron en las sesiones de un Seminario que sobre «Tschirnhaus y la Medicina mentis» se desarrolló en la Facultad de Filosofía de la Universidad de Barcelona en febrero de 2020. El Seminario, organizado por Pablo Montosa y Guillem Sales, continuaba una investigación sobre la obra de este filósofo y científico alemán que ambos habían iniciado tiempo atrás y (...) que habían presentado en una comunicación al V Congrés Català de Filosofía, ahora publicada con el título de «La crítica de E. W. von Tschirnhaus a la identificació cartesiana de consciència i coneixement» en las Actas de dicho congreso. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)